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  Inhibition and interference 1
Abstract 
Current associative theories of contingency learning assume that inhibitory learning 
plays a part in the interference between outcomes. However, it is unclear whether this 
inhibitory learning results in the inhibition of the outcome representation or whether it 
simply counteracts previous excitatory learning so that the outcome representation is 
neither activated nor inhibited. Additionally, these models tend to conceptualise inhibition 
as a relatively transient and cue-dependent state. However, research on retrieval-induced 
forgetting suggests that the inhibition of representations is a real process that can be 
relatively independent of the retrieval cue used to access the inhibited information. 
Consistent with this alternative view, we found that interference between outcomes reduces 
the retrievability of the target outcome even when the outcome is associated with a novel 
(non-inhibitory) cue. This result has important theoretical implications for associative 
models of interference and shows that the empirical facts and theories developed in studies 
of retrieval-induced forgetting might be relevant in contingency learning and vice versa. 
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Inhibition is a key concept in many areas of learning and memory research. To 
process information efficiently, humans (and other animals) need to know both when to 
expect a given event and when to expect its absence. Not surprisingly, most accounts of 
associative learning have dealt with the problem of inhibition and have included inhibitory 
mechanisms in their theoretical assumptions (e.g., Bouton, 1993; Dickinson & Burke, 
1996; Hull, 1943; Konorski, 1948; Mackintosh, 1975; Pavlov, 1927; Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994, Wagner, 1981).1 
Inhibitory processes are particularly relevant to understanding the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in situations in which a given cue is associated with different 
outcomes at different moments. Extinction, latent inhibition, and counterconditioning are 
some well-known examples of the learning phenomena that are studied within this 
paradigm (see, for example, Kerkhof, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2011; 
Pineño, De la Casa, Lubow, & Miller, 2006; Rosas & Callejas-Aguilera, 2006). Although 
there are some important differences among these effects, from a general point of view, all 
of them involve situations in which a cue, A, is paired with one outcome, O1, in Phase 1 
and with a different outcome, O2, in Phase 2. The usual result is that recall of one of the 
associations is reduced as a result of the training of the other association.2 Given the 
remarkable similarities among all these effects, we will use the general name of 
interference between outcomes to refer to them collectively. 
To cope with these sorts of situations, organisms must be able to process inconsistent 
information. Traditional theories of associative learning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) 
have assumed that such situations are resolved by deleting the knowledge of the A-O1 
association as the A-O2 training proceeds. However, in light of the abundant literature 
showing that these initial associations survive after interfering training (see, for example, 
Matute, Lipp, Vadillo, & Humphreys, 2011; Matute, Vegas, & De Marez, 2002; Rosas, 
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Vila, Lugo, & López, 2001; Vadillo, Vegas, & Matute, 2004), current theories have 
proposed that organisms solve these conflicting associative structures by means of 
inhibitory associations. For example, Bouton’s (1993, 1997) retrieval model assumes that 
after  the A-O1 association has been learned, learning the novel A-O2 association requires 
both the formation of a new excitatory link between A and O2 and the creation of an 
inhibitory association between A and O1 that counteracts the previously learned A-O1 
excitatory association (see Figure 1). 
Although Bouton’s model (1993, 1997) and some of the previously mentioned 
theories (e.g., Dickinson & Burke, 1996; Wagner, 1981) do stress the role of inhibitory 
associations in their explanations of interference between outcomes, it is unclear whether 
these models assume that O1 enters into an inhibitory state as a result of the action of these 
inhibitory links. From their point of view, the only purpose of the inhibitory A-O1 link is 
to suppress the action of the previously learned excitatory A-O1 association without 
actually deleting it. In other words, according to these accounts, the excitatory and 
inhibitory links cancel each other, so the presentation of A neither activates nor inhibits the 
representation of O1. Thus, interference between the outcomes involves some kind of 
inhibitory learning but not necessarily real outcome inhibition. 
Recent studies of retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995) provide an interesting insight into the inhibitory processes 
that are likely to intervene in the interference between outcomes. In a typical retrieval-
induced forgetting experiment, the participants are first exposed to a series of category-
exemplar pairings (e.g., Fruit-Banana, Fruit-Orange, Vehicle-Car, and Vehicle-Plane). 
During the second phase, they are asked to actively retrieve information about some of 
these exemplars, with the category name and the first letters of the exemplar name as 
retrieval cues (e.g., they are asked to fill in the gap in Fruit-Ba___). Finally, during the test 
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phase, the participants are asked to retrieve all the exemplars presented in the initial study 
phase (e.g., Fruit-Ba___, Fruit-Or___, Vehicle-Ca__, and Vehicle-Pl___). From an 
experimental point of view, all of these items can be divided in three broad groups: 
exemplars that have been actively retrieved in Phase 2 (e.g., Fruit-Banana); exemplars that 
have not been retrieved during Phase 2 but that belong to a practiced category (e.g., Fruit-
Orange); and exemplars that have not been retrieved during Phase 2 and do not belong to a 
practiced category (e.g., Vehicle-Car and Vehicle-Plane). These three categories of items 
are named Rp+, Rp-, and Nrp, respectively. As might be expected, Rp+ exemplars are 
usually recalled better than Nrp exemplars; that is, the active retrieval of Rp+ items during 
Phase 2 enhances their retrievability at testing. However, the most noteworthy result is that 
the recall of the Rp- exemplars is impaired relative to the Nrp exemplars; that is, training 
for the Rp+ exemplars results in both improved recall of these items and some inhibition of 
the related but untrained Rp- exemplars. This retrieval-induced forgetting effect has been 
observed in a wide variety of settings using very different materials, such as shapes and 
colours (Ciranni & Shimamura, 1999), sentences (Gómez-Ariza, Lechuga, Pelegrina, & 
Bajo, 2005), personality traits (Macrae & MacLeod, 1999; MacLeod & Macrae, 2001), 
eyewitness-memory scenes (Shaw, Bjork, & Handal, 1995), and affective stimuli (Amir, 
Brigidi, Coles, & Foa, 2001). 
Typical retrieval-induced forgetting experiments usually include a relatively long 
(about 5–20 min) retention interval between the active retrieval phase and the test phase. 
This feature suggests that retrieval-induced forgetting involves inhibiting representations 
and that this inhibition may be a long lasting effect. Additionally, extant evidence shows 
that retrieval-induced forgetting is a cue-independent process: once a representation has 
been inhibited, it remains inaccessible even if alternative retrieval cues are used to access 
that representation (Anderson & Spellman, 1995). In the above experiment, for example, 
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once the orange exemplar has been inhibited, its retrievability would remain low both 
when tested with the retrieval cue Fruit-Or___ and when tested with alternative retrieval 
cues, such as Citrus-Or___. Moreover, this type of inhibition can be observed even with 
testing procedures that do not depend on the presentation of retrieval cues at all, such as 
recognition tests (i.e., asking participants to tell whether or not an item has been presented 
during the training phase and measuring their accuracy and reaction time; see Hicks & 
Starns, 2004; Veling & van Knippenberg, 2004). 
The purpose of this study was to test whether a similar inhibitory process occurs in 
the interference between outcomes in a contingency-learning task. The design summary of 
the experiment is shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the participants were exposed to A-O1 
pairings in Phase 1 and to A-O2 pairings in Phase 2. The control condition consisted of B-
O3 trials in Phase 1 and C-O4 trials in Phase 2 and should not have given rise to any form 
of interference between the outcomes. This design is standard in interference-between-
outcomes experiments (see, for example, Rosas et al., 2001). Then, after a five-minute 
retention interval, participants were asked to learn two new associations: one between a 
novel cue, D, and O1, and another between an equally novel cue, E, and O3. If O1 had 
become relatively permanently inhibited in Phase 2, it would follow that learning the D-O1 
association would have proceeded more slowly than learning the E-O3 association. 
Moreover, given that O1 was predicted by a novel cue, D, the delay in the development of 
the D-O1 association was a measure of the extent to which the O1 inhibition was a cue-
independent state, similar to the ones that have been observed in retrieval-induced 
forgetting studies. 
Notice that in our design, the potential inhibition of O1 was tested by making 
participants learn a new association between a novel cue, D, and O1. We needed this 
procedure to test whether the effect can occur in response to a novel cue. However, this 
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design imposed demanding conditions for detecting any inhibitions that may have been 
produced during the interference treatment. First, any observation of O1 inhibition 
depended critically on comparing the responses to D and the responses to E. Our 
experiences with this task suggested that participants typically gave few or no responses to 
novel cues. If participants did not respond on the first E trial, determining an even lower 
level of response in the first D trial became impossible. Thus, no systematic responses to 
any of the outcomes were expected to occur on the first D and E trials. In other words, any 
inhibition that may have occurred could only be detected from the second test trial onward. 
Additionally, the first D-O1 trial required some active processing of O1, which presumably 
at least partially released O1 from its inhibited state, thereby reducing the chances of 
observing  differences between the conditions in the subsequent trials. Therefore, any 
tested differences between the D-O1 association learning and the E-O3 association 
learning were considered strong evidence for the intervention of an inhibitory process. 
Despite these hindrances, our task had the advantage of using a typical learning 
measure in human contingency-learning experiments instead of the more standard recall or 
recognition measures that have been used in retrieval-induced forgetting studies. This 
measure both provided convergent evidence for the pervasiveness of the inhibitory 
processes explored by memory researchers and helped to bridge the gap between these two 
areas of research (contingency learning and retrieval-induced forgetting), which explore 
similar phenomena but which have remained relatively unconnected. 
Methods 
Participants and apparatus 
One hundred and sixty-eight psychology students from the University of Deusto and 
the University of Málaga volunteered to take part in the experiment. The experiment was 
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conducted in two large computer rooms in which the participants maintained a one-meter 
distance from each other. The task was programmed using Visual Basic. 
Design and procedure 
The design of the experiment is shown in Table 1. Participants were exposed to two 
training phases and one test phase. During the first phase, two different cues, A and B, 
were paired with two different outcomes, O1 and O3, respectively. During Phase 2, cue A 
was paired with a new outcome, O2, and a novel cue, C, was paired with a different 
outcome, O4. Each variation of the trial in both phases was presented 15 times in a fixed, 
pseudorandom order to all the participants. After these two phases, the participants spent 
five minutes filling in a clinical inventory unrelated to the present experiment. During the 
final testing phase, two novel cues, D and E, were paired with O1 and O3, respectively. 
The participants were exposed to three D-O1 trials and three E-O3 trials. To avoid any 
trial-order effect at test, we constructed two different pseudorandom test sequences for the 
D-O1 and E-O3 trials (D-E-D-D-E-E and E-D-E-E-D-D), which were counterbalanced 
across the range of participants. 
The general procedure was similar to the one used by Luque, Morís, Cobos, and 
López (2009). First, the participants read the instructions and had the opportunity to ask 
questions. The participants could earn points by wagering on each trial. To do so, they had 
to learn the relationships between coloured rectangles and fictitious plants that played the 
roles of cues and outcomes, respectively. The colours of the rectangles used as the A-E 
cues were blue, yellow, pink, green, and brown (partially counterbalanced following a 
Latin-square design; therefore, all the colours played the role of all the cues, even though 
not all the potential combinations of colours and cues were used). The stimuli used for 
outcomes O1-O4 consisted of four pictures of plants with fictitious names underneath: 
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Kollin, Dobe, Yamma, and Lettsu. Their roles as the abstract outcomes shown in Table 1 
were also partially counterbalanced following the same Latin-square procedure. 
Before each trial, the rectangle at the middle top of the screen, in which the colour 
cues would later appear, was shaded in grey, indicating that the cue had not yet been 
presented. Below this rectangle, at the bottom of the screen, four small squares were 
shown, depicting the photographs of the four plants (which played the outcome role), each 
one with a text label indicating the response keys assigned to the individual plants (number 
keys 1, 2, 9, and 0). This information was shown before each trial; therefore, upon 
presentation of the cue, the participants needed to remember which response key was 
assigned to each plant. The matching of the response keys (1, 2, 9 or 0) to the plant names 
(Kollin, Dobe, Yamma, and Lettsu) was kept constant for all the participants. 
After this sequence, the coloured rectangle that played the role of the cue in the trial 
appeared for 2.5 s, and the participants had the option of wagering points on each outcome 
plant by pressing the appropriate keys. Once the 2.5 s time had elapsed, the cue 
disappeared, as indicated by the rectangle returning to its grey colour. To respond, the 
participants placed their wagers by pressing one or more of the response options located at 
the bottom of the screen. When a response key was kept pressed, the points wagered for 
the corresponding option increased continuously, as indicated by the movement of a scroll-
bar placed below the picture of each plant and by numbers in a text box increasing across a 
range from 0 to 100. 
In each trial, the participants earned as many points as they wagered on the correct 
plant and lost as many points as they wagered on the incorrect plants. After each wager, the 
participants were told which plant was the correct one in that trial (the correct plant 
remained visible), the amount of points earned or lost in that trial (in a text box on the 
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centre of the screen) and their current total point balances (in a text box on the top of the 
screen). The participants were then asked to press the space bar to proceed to the next trial. 
Results 
Data selection and dependent variables 
To guarantee that the participants had understood the instructions and paid enough 
attention to the task, we removed those participants who wagered zero points for the 
correct option from the sample in the last instance of each type of trial. Using this data 
selection criterion, eight participants were excluded from subsequent analysis (4.76% of 
the total sample). 
The performance of participants in this task can be measured with different 
dependent variables. Perhaps the first one would be the number of correct responses given 
by participants in response to each cue. In the case of the training trials, this would equal to 
measuring the number of points correctly wagered for Outcome 1 in response to A and the 
number of points correctly wagered for Outcome 3 in response to B during Phase 1, as well 
as the number of points correctly wagered for Outcome 2 in response to A and the number 
of points correctly wagered for Outcome 4 in response to C during Phase 2. However, an 
important problem with this dependent variable is that it is not completely free from the 
influence of factors that can be more related to strategic gambling than to pure learning or 
memory processes. For instance, some participants might decide to wager for a particular 
outcome only when they are completely sure that their response will be reinforced, while 
other participants might wager for different outcomes when they are not sure about the 
correct response. For example, wagering 10 points for Outcome 1 does not mean the same 
for one participant who also wagered 10 points for the other outcomes than for a different 
participant who only wagered for that specific outcome. Not surprisingly, many learning 
experiments conducted with similar tasks rely on a slightly different dependent measure 
  Inhibition and interference 10
that takes into account not only the responses to the correct outcome, but also the responses 
to the incorrect ones (e.g., see Rosas et al., 2001). In previous experiments conducted with 
this specific task (e.g., Luque & Vadillo, 2011), we have also found that the number of 
points earned (i.e., the number of correct responses minus the number of incorrect 
responses) can provide a more precise assessment of learning processes. Therefore, we 
used this measure as our main dependent variable in the present experiment. However, we 
also conducted the same analyses on the number of correct responses and briefly report 
their results. 
Training phases 
The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the mean number of points earned by participants 
through the two learning phases, collated by blocks of three trials. A 2 (Cue: A vs. B) x 5 
(Block: 1-5) analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted on data from Phase 1 yielded a 
significant main effect for the Block factor, F(4, 636) = 315.07, p < .001, indicating better 
performance as training proceeded, and an unexpected Cue x Block interaction, F(4, 636) 
= 7.03, p < .001. This interaction represented the differences between the responses to A 
and B in some of the trials. However, these differences did not systematically favour 
responses to one cue over the other, as shown by the absence of a main effect for the Cue 
factor, F(1, 159) < 1. Moreover, there were no significant differences between A and B in 
the last block, t(159) = 0.59, p = .558, showing that the responses to both cues eventually 
converged to the same asymptotic level of performance. 
A similar 2 (Cue: A vs. C) x 5 (Block: 1-5) ANOVA conducted on the number of 
points earned during Phase 2 revealed significant main effects for the Cue, F(1, 159) = 
304.76, p < .001, and the Block factors, F(4, 636) = 874,17, p < .001. Moreover, these 
effects were qualified by a significant Cue x Block interaction, F(4, 636) = 263.2, p < .001. 
This interaction was due to the participants’ performance being less accurate for cue A 
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than for cue C early in Phase 2; performance became equally accurate for both cues by the 
end of the training. T-tests confirmed that the number of points earned during the first four 
blocks of the A trials was significantly lower than the number of points earned during the 
same C trials, all ts(159) > 2.83, ps < .01. However, these differences disappeared during 
the last block of trials, t(159) = 1.26, p = .21. This poor performance in response to A was 
a natural consequence of the previous pairings of cue A with a different outcome in Phase 
1; it is perfectly consistent with previous demonstrations of proactive interference in 
memory experiments (Keppel & Underwood, 1962) and similar associative learning 
studies (Amundson, Escobar, & Miller, 2003; Castro, Ortega, & Matute, 2002). 
The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the mean number of correct responses for the 
same training trials. As can be seen, the pattern of results is virtually identical. When the 
previous ANOVAs and planned comparisons were conducted on these data, the pattern of 
significant effects was exactly the same. 
Test phase 
The mean number of points earned across the three test trials is depicted in Figure 3. 
A 2 (Cue: D vs. E) x 3 (Trial: 1-3) ANOVA conducted on this measure yielded a 
significant effect of the Trial factor, F(2, 318) = 372.87, p < .001, but no significant Cue x 
Trial interaction, F(1, 318) = 1.29, p = .28. Most importantly, the main effect of the Cue 
factor was statistically significant, F(1, 159) = 4.04, p < .05. The significant main effect of 
Cue reflects that the mean number of points earned across the test trials was significantly 
larger for Cue E (M = 24.18, SEM = 0.91) than for Cue D (M = 21.85, SEM = 1.15), a 
result that supports the hypothesis that the interference-between-outcomes treatment 
resulted in the inhibition of the O1 representation. 
Table 2 summarizes the number of points bet to each of the outcomes during test 
trials D1-D3 and E1-E3. In order to check whether similar results are obtained when the 
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number of correct responses (instead of points earned) are analysed, we conducted a 2 
(Cue: D vs. E) x 3 (Trial: 1-3) ANOVA on this dependent variable. This analysis yielded a 
significant main effect of the Trial factor, F(2, 318) = 575.75, p < .001, and no significant 
Cue x Trial interaction, F(2, 318) = 0.58, p = .56. Most importantly, the main effect of the 
Cue factor was still marginally significant, F(1, 159) = 2.62, p = .10. Although this effect 
misses statistical significance by traditional standards, it is nevertheless noteworthy that it 
approached significance, given that this variable does not correct for indiscriminate 
responding and it is, therefore, less valid and trustworthy than the number of points earned. 
As discussed in the Introduction, no inhibitory effects were expected in the first test 
trial because of the experimental design. However, we decided to further explore this issue 
by analysing a different dependent variable. Instead of comparing the number of points 
earned during the first D trials and the first E trial, we tested whether the participants 
avoided responding to O1 compared with the control O3 in the first trial of the test phase 
with the novel cues (D for some participants and E for others, depending on the 
counterbalancing condition of each participant). As expected, this analysis showed no 
significant difference between the number of O1 responses (M = 3.26, SEM = 0.61) and the 
number of O3 responses (M = 3.57, SEM = 0.68), t(159) = 0.32, p = .75. The low number 
of responses in this trial showed that the participants were reluctant to respond to novel 
cues, a feature that precluded any serious attempt to detect inhibition in the first test trial. 
It is possible to think at least of one alternative explanation for this pattern of 
responding at test that is not dependent on inhibitory processes.3 During Phases 1 and 2, 
participants can learn that the cue predicting O1 can also predict O2. This can interfere 
with learning the D-O1 association (and responding according to it) in several ways. For 
example, once participants see that D predicts O1 they can infer that O2 might appear on 
some trials, because in the past cues that predicted O1 also predicted O2 in some 
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occasions. This would produce the pattern of results depicted in Figure 3 without the 
involvement of inhibitory processes. A similar mechanism can operate in purely 
associative (but non-inhibitory) terms: As participants learn the D-O1 association, the 
presentation of D activates the memory of A (by virtue of a backward O1-A association), 
and A activates the representation of O2, which would then interfere with correctly 
responding to O1. An important prediction made by these alternative accounts is that the 
intrusion of O2 responses during the test phase should be responsible for the poor 
responding to Cue D. Moreover, this intrusion should become stronger as training 
proceeds. Figure 4 depicts the number of intrusive O2 responses to D, in contrast to the 
number of intrusive O2 and O4 responses to E. Contrary to these non-inhibitory accounts, 
there is no evidence that the number of O2 intrusions is higher for D than for E. Moreover, 
if anything, the number of intrusions tends to decrease as training proceeds. A 3 (Cue-
Response Combination: D-O2, E-O2, E-O4) x 3 (Trial: 1-3) ANOVA conducted on these 
data yielded a significant effect of Trial, F(2, 302) = 13.09, p < .001, but no effect of Cue-
Response Combination, F(2, 302) < 1, and no interaction between both factors, F(4, 604) = 
1.07, p = .368. 
Discussion 
As mentioned in the Introduction, many current associative theories assume that 
organisms process outcome-interference situations using inhibitory mechanisms. In these 
models, however, the inhibitory associations are assumed to simply counteract the previous 
excitatory learning, and the representations of the irrelevant outcomes are neither activated 
nor inhibited. In contrast to this view, the results of the present experiment suggest that 
interference between outcomes can involve the inhibition of the outcome representation. 
Moreover, this outcome inhibition seems to be a state that does not vanish immediately 
after termination of the interference training and that is independent of the cue used to 
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access the representation of the outcome (i.e., once inhibited, the outcome remains 
inaccessible even when alternative retrieval cues are used). Although these properties are 
not anticipated by associative models, they are consistent with empirical research and 
theories on retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson et al., 1994; Anderson & Spellman, 
1995). 
Our ability to observe an inhibitory effect in our experiment was noteworthy. To 
bridge the gap between standard retrieval-induced forgetting studies and contingency-
learning studies, we were obliged to use a procedure and design that might have been 
suboptimal for observing a strong inhibitory effect. As explained above, there was no 
reason to expect differences in the first test trial, given that the participants could not be 
expected to know which outcome would be associated with each of the novel cues. 
Additionally, each test trial required the presentation of the outcomes, thus obliging the 
participants to actively process the outcomes and reducing any inhibition of their 
representation as the testing proceeded. Note, however, that this limitation was not a 
peculiarity of our experimental design but rather is common to all the testing procedures 
for retrieval-induced forgetting that require the explicit presentation of the inhibited item as 
part of the probe trial (such as recognition tests; see Hicks & Starns, 2004; Veling & van 
Knippenberg, 2004). Our observation of a significant difference in spite of this feature 
should be taken as strong evidence in favour of the intervention of inhibitory processes. 
Although we have interpreted the results of our experiment in associative terms, our 
design and procedure admittedly did not allow us to ensure that the inhibitory effect we 
detected was in fact a product of associative processes. For example, the inhibition of O1 
may have resulted from the participants’ inferring and using rules or propositions that 
described the contingencies presented to them during the learning phases (Lovibond, 
2004). Interestingly, the vast majority of the literature on retrieval-induced forgetting and 
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similar memory effects suggests that controlled, non-associative processes are likely to be 
involved in these inhibitory effects. For example, retrieval-induced forgetting tends to be 
absent or reduced in populations with executive control deficits or few working-memory 
resources (Aslan & Bäuml, 2010, 2011; Soriano, Jiménez, Román, & Bajo, 2009). 
Similarly, retrieval-induced forgetting is also reduced when participants are asked to 
perform a cognitively demanding secondary task (Román, Soriano, Gómez-Ariza, & Bajo, 
2009). These results suggest the possibility that other features of controlled processes 
(Moors & De Houwer, 2006) may also operate on retrieval-induced forgetting. For 
example, are the inhibitory effects sensitive to the previous abstract knowledge of the 
participants? Do they depend on the conscious goal of inhibiting representations? In our 
opinion, these subtle distinctions have received more attention in contingency-learning 
research than in the study of retrieval-induced forgetting (see Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009; Shanks, 2010). Therefore, future research on inhibition in memory 
retrieval may benefit from the methodological developments and theoretical debates that 
have occurred in contingency-learning research over the past few decades. The 
experimental preparation and design that we have presented here could easily be used to 
bridge that gap (see, for example, Cobos, López, & Luque, 2007; Luque, Cobos, & López, 
2008). 
Conversely, research on contingency learning can also benefit from the vast quantity 
of ideas and experimental data provided by the abundant literature on retrieval-induced 
forgetting. These studies both contain information about the general properties of 
inhibition and propose interesting theoretical interpretations of those effects that could 
potentially be applied to explain interference in contingency learning. For example, 
Anderson et al. (1994) have suggested that retrieval-induced forgetting can be understood 
either in terms of lateral inhibition (i.e., there are inhibitory associations between different 
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exemplars, and retrieving one of them automatically inhibits related exemplars) or in terms 
of active and voluntary suppression by an executive mechanism responsible for both the 
activation of relevant information and the inhibition of irrelevant information (see 
Anderson & Green, 2001). These two alternative explanations are represented in Figure 4A 
and 4B, respectively. It is interesting to note the remarkable differences between these two 
accounts and the standard explanation of current associative theories (as depicted in Figure 
1). To our knowledge, none of the existing evidence traditionally invoked in support of 
associative theories can be used to discard the structures depicted in Figure 4A and 4B. 
Moreover, these kinds of alternative mechanisms have rarely been considered as potential 
explanations for interference phenomena in contingency-learning studies (but see O’Boyle 
& Bouton, 1996, for an interesting exception). Therefore, these two models taken from the 
literature on retrieval-induced forgetting should be carefully considered in future research 
as potential explanations for learning phenomena related to interference between 
outcomes. 
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Footnotes 
 
1 Note, however, that many of these theories encompass radically different views of what 
inhibitory learning is (for a review, see Dickinson, 1980). Some well-known models, such 
as the comparator hypothesis (Miller & Matzel, 1988; Stout & Miller, 2007), even assume 
that the inhibition-related phenomena are behavioural effects that emerge from the 
operation of non-inhibitory associative processes. For the sake of simplicity, we will not 
discuss these different views of inhibitory learning in detail. 
 
2 This broad definition is particularly well suited for counterconditioning, an effect in 
which O1 and O2 stand as independent events, usually with opposite affective values. In 
the case of extinction, O2 is defined as the mere absence of the outcome trained in Phase 1, 
O1. Similarly, in latent inhibition O1 is defined as the absence of the outcome that would 
be trained in Phase 2, O2. 
 
3 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention towards this 
alternative account. 
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Table 1 
Design summary of the experiment 
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Retention interval Test phase 
15 AÆO1 
15 BÆO3 
15 AÆO2 
15 CÆO4 
5 min 
3 DÆO1 
3 EÆO3 
 
Note. Letters A to E denote the different coloured rectangles playing the role of cues. 
O1 to O4 represent the different fictitious plant names playing the role of outcomes. 
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Table 2 
Points bet to each outcome during the test phase 
 
  O1 O2 O3 O4 
Cue Trial M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM 
D 
1 4.43 0.80 0.84 0.34 1.53 0.46 1.89 0.53 
2 33.11  1.49 0.52  0.29 0.41  0.25 1.31  0.48 
3 37.66  1.23 0.24  0.22 2.79  0.80 0.14  0.14 
E 
1 1.96 0.50 1.00 0.34 4.71 0.86 1.51 0.48 
2 0.72  0.41 0.57  0.28 35.26  1.31 0.22  0.15 
3 0.60  0.33 0.01  0.01 39.26  0.98 0.10  0.10 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the associative structure underlying interference 
between outcomes in most current associative theories. Initial exposure to A-O1 
pairings results in the development of an excitatory association between A and O1. 
Later training with A-O2 pairings gives rise to the development of an A-O2 
excitatory association and also to an inhibitory link between A and O1. Excitatory 
links are denoted by straight arrows, and inhibitory links are denoted by dotted 
arrows. 
Figure 2. The upper panel shows the mean number of points earned during Phases 1 and 2 
correct responses. The lower panel shows the mean number of correct responses 
during the same trials. The error bars denote the standard error of the mean. 
Figure 3. Mean number of points earned during each trial of the test phase. The error bars 
denote the standard error of the mean. 
Figure 4. Mean number of intrusive incorrect responses to D and E during the test phase. 
Error bars denote the standard error of the mean. 
Figure 5. Graphical representation of alternative accounts of interference between 
outcomes, based on the extant literature on retrieval-induced forgetting. In the top 
panel (4A), the inhibition of O1 is the product of a lateral-inhibition mechanism. In 
the lower panel (4B), a central mechanism is responsible for the voluntary and 
controlled activation of O2 and the inhibition of O1. 
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